Safety / System architecture

Autonomy needs boundaries.

A robot that can make decisions must also understand what it is not allowed to do. Safety is therefore not a single sensor or emergency button. It is a layered system of constraints, monitoring, hardware limits and human authority.

01 / Safety philosophy
Architecture before feature

Safety is an architecture.

ARUS treats safety as a system-level engineering discipline. The required architecture depends on the machine, task, environment and deployment. No universal statement can make every robotic operation safe. Safety must be engineered for the actual work.

01 Bound task scope
02 Expose operating state
03 Constrain physical motion
04 Move uncertainty toward safe states
02 / Layered constraints
Task / space / motion / hardware

Autonomy is allowed through layers, not by assumption.

01 Task limits ↓
02 Spatial constraints ↓
03 Motion limits ↓
04 Force limits ↓
05 Speed limits ↓
06 Collision awareness ↓
07 Hardware constraints ↓
08 Emergency stop ■
03 / Human authority
Operator control / intervention

The operator remains part of the system.

Depending on deployment architecture, human authority may include supervised autonomy, manual stop, emergency stop, manual intervention, restricted operating modes, task approval, remote supervision and maintenance control. Autonomy does not remove operational responsibility.

A01

Override

Human command can interrupt autonomous task execution.

A02

Stop

Stop states are separated from normal task pauses.

A03

Supervision

Operating state and uncertainty are exposed to operators.

A04

Intervention

Manual procedures depend on the machine and deployment.

04 / Fault behaviour
Degraded confidence / safe state

Uncertain state changes the allowed behaviour.

When sensor confidence degrades, communication is lost, obstruction appears, motion becomes inconsistent or system state becomes uncertain, the robot should move toward a defined safe state for that deployment.

01 Sensor confidence degrades
02 Communication is lost
03 Unexpected obstruction occurs
04 Motion or state becomes inconsistent
05 / Physical constraints
Zones / margins / envelopes

The robot operates inside physical envelopes.

P01

Speed zones

Allowed speed depends on area, task, payload and proximity.

P02

Force limits

Force constraints bound contact-rich motion and manipulation.

P03

Restricted regions

Operating maps can define no-go areas and guarded zones.

P04

Collision margins

Motion planning keeps clearance and response distance in view.

06 / Validation
Simulation to deployment

Validation moves from model to controlled operation.

Safety validation is deployment-specific. ARUS uses staged checks across simulation, bench work, subsystem testing, integrated testing, controlled pilots and operational rollout.

01 Simulation ↓
02 Bench ↓
03 Subsystem ↓
04 Integrated ↓
05 Pilot ↓
06 Deploy ■
07 / Observability
Telemetry / fault reporting

A safety system must be observable.

O01

Event logs

Actions, stops and state changes are part of diagnostic history.

O02

Telemetry

Robot state, confidence and faults help operators understand operation.

O03

State

Operating state should be explicit across robot, interface and team.

O04

Diagnostics

Fault reporting supports recovery, review and engineering change.

08 / Product safety
Machine-specific implementation

Safety implementation varies by machine type.

AR-H, AR-M and AR-X share the same safety philosophy, but the implementation changes with body architecture, mobility, payload, tooling, operating space and human proximity.

09 / Safety CTA
Engineering inquiry

Discuss safety constraints before deployment.

The right safety conversation starts with task scope, environment, people, payload, tooling and recovery states.